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Introduction and background
Zimbabwe is experiencing ongoing migration 
from rural areas to destinations both within and 
outside the country (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2010). 
International destinations include South Africa and 
Botswana, as well as Europe and the Americas. 
It is estimated that over 3.5 million Zimbabweans 
are living in South Africa alone (Chereni and Bongo, 
2018). The transformative potential and economic 
value of this mobility for Zimbabweans has been 
questioned, however. While some scholars indicate 
that remittance flows have a significant impact on 
gross domestic product (Christiansen et al., 2006; 
Awumbila, Owusu and Teye, 2014), others argue 
that the impacts of migration at the household 
level do not match those at the macro level (Tevera, 
Crush and Chikanda, 2010). Studies in this latter 
tradition have not indicated the nature of the policy 
interventions required to make migration more 
beneficial to migrant-sending households.
The study that forms the basis of this Policy Brief 
(Dzingirai et al., 2019) was conducted as part of the 
Migrating out of Poverty intra-household research 
programme, which seeks to understand the relationship 
between migration and households that send migrants 
away to earn money. The ultimate objective was to test 
if indeed migration was moving households out of 
poverty, and if not, to identify the factors preventing 
this. This Policy Brief presents a summary of the 
study and pulls out issues for policy consideration.
Brief review of existing 
policies and gaps
Zimbabwe’s economy recorded real growth of 
roughly 10 per cent per year in 2010–11, following 
a decade of contraction from 1998 to 2008 (IOM, 
2015). This growth slumped in 2012–13 as a result 
of poor harvests and low revenue inflows. Owing 
to the worsening political and economic crisis, 
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challenges persist, including fiscal and monetary 
constraints, infrastructure deficiencies, lack of foreign 
direct investment, policy uncertainties, a large external 
debt burden and insufficient formal employment 
(IOM, 2015). In this context, there are high rates 
of irregular emigration from many communities 
by migrants seeking livelihood opportunities in 
South Africa and Botswana. Remittances are a key 
aspect of household and social resilience. There 
remains, however, the need to address the national 
migration governance framework and systems in 
a context where the legal and policy framework is 
weak and institutional capacities are inadequate and 
poorly coordinated (IOM, 2015). These structural 
inadequacies in migration management, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) notes, 
undermine the Zimbabwean government’s ability to 
harness the development potential of migration at 
both community and national levels.
Both the government and international organisations 
such as the IOM and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) have undertaken initiatives in the 
past to harness the benefits of labour migration. For 
example, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ), in 
collaboration with the IOM and the ILO, established 
Beitbridge and Plumtree Reception and Support 
Centers in 2006 and 2008, respectively; Zimbabwe 
and South Africa signed a four-year Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in 2004 and a second one in 
2010, which lapsed in 2014 and is still due for renewal; 
and Limpopo intervention strategies targeting farm 
workers produced and pilot-tested a data base 
and framework for recruitment with guidelines for 
contracts and processes. Bilateral discussions to renew 
the second MoU have been initiated (GOZ, 2011).
There is still a need for Zimbabwe to introduce 
a sound migration governance framework that 
benefits all migrants as well as the country itself 
through improved laws, policies and institutional 
capacities for migration management (IOM, 2015). 
Such a framework should reflect the need for 
bilateral and multilateral social security agreements 
and for establishing mechanisms through which the 
social security systems of the different countries 
can work together to ensure that migrant workers 
have complete and continuous protection.1 It should 
also help to facilitate access to the necessary travel 
documents, as highlighted in the GOZ Migration 
and Development Agenda Work Plan (2010–2011). 
Furthermore, it should take a gender-sensitive 
approach to labour migration, and it should bring 
in effective mechanisms for harnessing remittances 
for investment and development, in line with the 
Migration and Development Strategy (GOZ, 2011). 
Key ministries in migration governance identified 
by the IOM include the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare.
The National Labour Migration Policy for Zimbabwe 
(approved in 2019) is a crucial step in that direction. 
It provides the necessary framework to harmonise 
existing initiatives by various institutions in order 
to harness the development gains from labour 
migration and contribute towards national 
development (GOZ, 2011).
Methodology of the study
The research on which this Policy Brief is based was 
conducted at three sites in Zimbabwe: the districts 
of Chivi, Hurungwe and Gwanda. Gwanda is close 
to the border with Botwana and close to the South 
African border. Chivi is also in the southern part of the 
country, northeast of Gwanda, and Hurungwe is in 
the north of the country, on the border with Zambia. 
These districts send significantly high numbers of 
migrants to both Zimbabwean and international 
destinations (Dzingirai et al., 2015). Our surveys were 
conducted in 2015 and 2018 and involved 1,200 
households. The study was also complemented by 
workshops designed to elicit comments on the data 
and the way they had been interpreted.
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Key findings of the study 
a. Changes in migration patterns
Between 2015 and 2018 there was an increase in 
internal migration. Chivi and Hurungwe districts 
experienced a drop in households sending migrants 
to international destinations and an increase in 
those sending migrants to destinations within 
Zimbabwe. These changes followed the dollarisation 
of the economy in Zimbabwe, outbreaks of 
xenophobia in South Africa and challenges related 
to securing passports. In explaining the reasons for 
such an increase, one respondent said:
The dollarisation of the economy is one issue 
that caused working [sic] within Zimbabwe 
more favourable. The money had value and 
some of the migrants acquired skills such as 
building and came back to work in this country, 
which would lessen the number of those abroad.
On the other hand, Gwanda district experienced 
both an increase in households without migrants 
and an increase in households sending migrants 
to international destinations. Respondents cited 
the proximity to the border and the shared 
culture with South Africa and Botswana as a factor 
encouraging this migration, which remains largely 
undocumented. In support of this, a respondent in 
the area said:
We have Sotho ancestry and share the same 
culture with the South Africans and Tswana in 
Botswana. A person across the border speaks 
the same language as the person here. That 
is why most of our people can easily cross the 
border to SA or Botswana.
b. Changes in migration patterns by gender 
The study also found that there were more internal 
male migrants than female ones in 2018. Conversely, 
there were more female than male migrants going 
to other African countries. The female migrants 
were mostly single mothers and girls who had 
dropped out of school, who saw their future as 
taking place beyond the borders of Zimbabwe. More 
female than male migrants took the risk of migrating 
without social networks or even a job arranged for 
them prior to moving. More migrants took these 
risks in 2018 than in 2015. Worsening economic 
hardship even forced people to take the risk of 
migrating to unfamiliar destinations. Respondents 
reported that female migrants had failed to secure 
a job locally and then migrated to South Africa. 
In most cases, women and young girls are less 
educated than men, which means they have limited 
opportunities for employment within Zimbabwe.
c. Socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics of migrants
Between 2015 and 2018, the economic situation 
in Zimbabwe started to decline, with growing 
unemployment, inflation and droughts within the 
participating districts. Under these circumstances, 
households started sending women (including 
married women) away to earn money. Compared 
to 2015, when migration was dominated by people 
who did not have primary-level education,2 in 
2018, there was a slight increase in the proportion of 
migrants with at least some post-primary education. 
In our sample there were no migrants with vocational 
training. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the majority 
of the migrants were not gainfully employed before 
migrating, for both the 2015 and 2018 survey. Very 
few migrants were employed in technical professions. 
d. Remittances and methods used to send 
and receive money
There was an increase in the amount of remittances 
sent by migrants between the 2015 and the 2018 
household surveys. This was confirmed in all the 
three districts. Participants attributed the increase 
in the amount of remittances to the increasing 
hardship back home, which meant that more 
money was required to cushion the households 
from the economic crisis. This therefore shows that 
remittances are a very important safety net for 
otherwise very vulnerable households.
3
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The results show that in 2015 the most popular 
methods for sending money used by both male and 
female migrants were Western Union, personal 
delivery, drivers and malaitshas.3 There was a slight 
shift towards using formal money transfer systems 
such as banks and mobile money systems between 
2015 and 2018, particularly among male migrants. 
Formal channels, especially Mukuru and Ecocash,4 
are attractive. Not only were these methods 
considered less risky, but in areas such as Hurungwe, 
the disadvantages of informal remittance channels 
were compounded by the fact that the remittances 
were not delivered to the household’s door and 
the recipients would have to make long journeys 
to obtain them. An elderly female respondent in 
Hurungwe had this to say: 
The remittances sent through the malaitshas 
are not delivered door to door and we have had 
to travel to as far as Harare to collect them. 
This was too risky as the malaitshas would take 
advantage of our illiteracy, keeping some of the 
money for themselves. Worse, in Harare, there 
are lots of thieves and the risk of losing the 
remittances was very high.
Compared to 2015, in 2018 nearly every household 
had a mobile phone that they could use to receive 
money. However, one of the concerns was the 
increasing cost of mobile money transactions. 
The liquidity crisis that has plagued the country 
from 2016 has seen remittances being affected by 
exorbitant transaction costs imposed by service 
providers upon cash withdrawal. Compounding 
this are also the excessive interest rates charged 
by shop owners. In illustrating this point, a female 
respondent in Gwanda stated:
I receive my money through Ecocash and because 
of the cash shortages I then decided to use it 
as plastic money. The problem is that the shop 
owners add huge charges and I end up paying 
more for the simple reason that I do not have cash.
e. Remittances and gender
Female migrants were more concerned with the 
most basic needs of the family and with family 
emergencies than men and hence they sent money 
frequently. In some cases, female migrants who 
left their children with grandparents at home 
sent goods and groceries. When sending goods 
using malaitshas, women were asked to pay a fee 
equivalent to more than half the value of the goods. 
The argument has always been that part of the 
money goes towards the payment of duty at the 
border, although goods are rarely declared to the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. 
f. Household welfare
Results show that in 2015, 54 per cent of the 
respondents thought that the welfare of a household 
sending a migrant away to earn money was generally 
better that that of a household from which no one 
migrated, while in 2018, 56 per cent of respondents 
expressed that view. Some migrant-sending 
households were building better houses. Our 
feedback meetings confirmed that there were some 
households whose welfare had remained stagnant 
or had even worsened after sending a member 
away. This was especially the case where migrants 
had started their own families in the diaspora, which 
introduced competition for their earnings. 
The study asked migrant-sending households how 
their daily lives compared between the present 
and before they sent a member away. About 15 per 
cent of migrant-sending households interviewed 
in 2015 and 2018, respectively, thought that their 
daily lives had improved compared to before a 
member had migrated. Otherwise, the majority of 
migrant-sending households reported that their 
daily lives had not changed or had even worsened. 
The evaluation workshop confirmed that these 
households faced huge non-economic costs, such as 
stress as a result of separation.
4
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goods and receiving money.
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Policy recommendations 
While the above findings raise many issues, this 
Policy Brief only addresses three key ones, which 
were flagged by participants. We believe that these 
policy recommendations can contribute to making 
migration an effective mechanism for taking these 
households and communities out of poverty and 
maximising and harnessing its full developmental 
potential. 
 
1. Facilitating legal migration
Some migrants take the risk of migrating without 
connections or even a job fixed for them prior to 
moving. This form of migration is dangerous and 
exposes them to risks. This Policy Brief supports the 
proposed National Labour Migration Policy, which 
calls for coordinated action between the Ministries 
of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs to improve the 
accessibility and affordability of identity documents 
such as passports, national identity cards and birth 
certificates for Zimbabwean nationals in order to 
facilitate legal migration and reduce the risks faced 
by migrants. Migration could also be regularised 
through bilateral labour agreements or MoUs in 
key low-skilled sectors such as domestic work, 
construction and hospitality, which Zimbabwean 
migrants in South Africa tend to occupy. Already, 
Zimbabwe has signed an MoU with South Africa 
covering agricultural workers. There remains a 
need for the MoUs to be expanded to cover all 
migrant workers in different sectors (GOZ, 2019). 
Working closely with the government, NGOs could 
facilitate the creation of migrant associations and 
brokers that facilitate the migration processes and 
placement of workers within key sectors. With 
the right legal recognition, these actors could also 
provide migrants with support in the form of soft 
loans or a cushion to help ease settlement at their 
destinations.
2. Ensuring portability of social rights
The study shows that migrants, especially women, 
have a poor educational background and little 
work experience. As a result they are exploited 
as cheap labour and employed in low-paid jobs. 
Irregular migrants do not have access to any social 
protection if they return home after experiencing 
unfair dismissal or xenophobic violence. There is 
a need to ensure that these migrants enjoy social 
protection and benefits through the portability 
of social rights from the sending to the receiving 
country. In this regard, this Policy Brief reiterates 
the need for bilateral and multilateral social 
security agreements and for mechanisms to be 
established through which the social security 
systems of the different countries can work 
together to ensure that migrant workers have 
complete and continuous protection. 
3. Facilitating affordable money transfer 
for remittances
Remittances have been a key aspect of household 
and social resilience for Zimbabwe in times of 
crisis. Challenges related to high transaction costs, 
interest and charges associated with the sending 
of remittances persist. Migrants resort to using 
informal channels, which present several risks 
and costs that could be avoided if formal money 
transfer channels were affordable. In this regard, 
the Policy Brief recommends that the Government 
of Zimbabwe liaise with other countries to reduce 
or subsidise bank charges imposed for remittance 
sending, so as to increase the frequency of 
remitting. Further, the government should take 
measures to prevent unlawful interest charges by 
service providers. Formal cash withdrawal facilities 
should be available in the migrant-sending areas to 
reduce the costs of travelling to towns for banking 
services, and labour-receiving countries like South 
Africa should be urged to facilitate migrant workers’ 
access to financial services. We firmly support the 
recommendations made by the IOM in this regard, 
namely to expand financial institutions so as to 
reduce migrant workers’ costs, and to provide 
access to financial services in rural areas.
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